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2001 DANIELJ. MEADORLECTURE:
COURTSOR TRIBUNALS?
FEDERAL
COURTSAND THE
COMMON
LAW
Peter L. Strauss*
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several States.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmesl
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate,
but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from
molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could not say
I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense
and shall not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of
the common-law rules of master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes2
[Tlhe standard so fixed scarcely advances the solution in a concrete case; it only eliminates the egregious, leaving the tribunal
a free hand to do as it thinks best. But that is inevitable unless
liability is to be determined by a manual, mythically prolix, and
fantastically impractical. . . . In the end [our judgment] may
seem merely a fiat, but that is always true, whatever the disguise.
Judge Learned Hand3
'

Vice Dean and Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. The 2001
Daniel J. Meador Lecture was delivered at The University of Alabama School of Law on November 2, 2001. Michael Dorf, Harold Edgar. Cynthia Farina, Helen Hershkoff, Larry Kramer,
John Manning, Henry Monaghan, Jim Pfander, and a faculty workshop at Rutgers-Camden Law
School all contributed thoughtful commentary on earlier drafts; any deficiencies in this analysis
are my doing only.
1.
OLIVER WENDELLHOLMES,COLLECTED LEGALPAPERS295-96 (1920).
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In his masterpiece, A Man For All Seasons, Robert Bolt puts his
protagonist, Thomas More, into conversation with his son-in-law
Roper. Rich, an evil character who will bring More's downfall, has just
left the stage:
Alice (exasperated, pointing afer Rich) While you talk he's
gone!
More And go he should if he was the devil himself until he
broke the law!
Roper So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
More Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the Devil?
Roper I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More (roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper.) And
when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
where would you hide, Roper, the laws being all flat? (Leaves
him) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to
coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and
you're just the man to do it-d'you really think you could stand
upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd
give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.4

These words stand as an important warning to us today, as we work
to contain and destroy the Devil himself. They can serve, too, to introduce the less dramatic subject I had chosen when you honored me with
your invitation to give the Meador Lecture, well before the recent horrors so disturbed us all. I chose as my text a recent Supreme Court dictum that seemed to me to knock over quite a few trees: "Raising up
causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper
function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals. What?
When Article I11 established the federal judiciary, its drafters imagined
something other than a court, as that term would then have been conventionally understood, something different in kind from the blackrobed members of state judiciaries? To invoke a special class of "federal tribunals" whose actions are not to be confused with those of
common law courts suggests broader implications than the long-familiar
debates about Erie,6 or the more recent contentions over when, if ever,
it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid

"'

2.
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Sinram v. Penn. R.R. Co.. 61 F.2d 767.771 (2d Cir. 1932).
3.
4.
ROBERT BOLT,A MANFOR ALLSEASONSact 1.41-42 (Methuen Drama 1995).
5.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
6.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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of federal statutes; this seems to be about the nature of the institutions,
not elements of their jurisdiction or prudential rules for the exercise of
their powers. The question has a lot less importance than diverting the
dagger currently aimed at America's heart and the world's liberties. But
the aside was uttered in Alexander v. S a n d ~ v a la, ~case that came to the
Court from here in Alabama, and it directly evokes Professor Meador's
lifetime of scholarship about federal courts. At the time it was hard to
imagine a more appropriate subject for this lecture; I hope you will
forgive my continuing to address it, even as we honor our dead and
confront yet again the truth of enduring evil in our world.
Justice Antonin Scalia is the author of these words-he is quoting
himself, as he likes to do, from an earlier, lonelier concurrence. And
there is some reason to think that, so far as common law method is concerned, he remains alone. In another of last Term's decision^,^ one that
I have written about in a different c ~ n t e x the
, ~ was the sole dissenter
from an opinion by Justice Souter that relied on the potential for caseby-case development of an imperfect statutory framework to resolve a
difficult issue of federal administrative law-that is, the classic common
law approach to resolution of an issue the Court concluded had not been
crisply resolved by Congress or its prior decisions. Justice Scalia's dissent angrily insisted on forcing what would be, in my judgment, an
unnatural and unwise reading, to avoid any such inquiry, necessarily
subjective in his view. Justice Souter, writing for all the other members
of the Court, remarked that "Justice Scalia's first priority over the
years has been to limit and simplify. The Court's choice has been to
tailor deference to variety. . . . Our respective choices are repeated
today."'?
Yet while the Court as a whole continues, perhaps unsurprisingly,
to deploy the familiar methods of the common law-insisting, notably,
on the force of precedent as well as the possibility of case-by-case development of doctrine-its members also join with some regularity in
expressing doubts, as in Sandoval, about federal courts fashioning law
in the common law way. Indeed, modern times have brought greater
scholarly and judicial ferment about the judicial function than perhaps
we have seen since the New Deal. The Court's work and that of several
commentators engender the sense of a virtual revolution, whether the
subject is respect for congressional judgment about social fact," debates
-

7.
8.
9.

-

-

-

-

-

532 U.S. 275 (2001).

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See Peter L. Strauss. Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper
Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN.L. REV. 803 (2001); see also Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV.1789, 1798 (1991).
10. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236-37 (footnotes omitted).
11. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
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over the proper approach to statutory interpretation,12 or-my subject
tonight-suggestions that the courts of state judicial systems and the
"federal tribunals" of the national judiciary fundamentally differ in
their nature. America has gone through more than one cycle of judicial
activism and retreat-the activism sometimes in service of liberal principles and sometimes conservative ones, the retreats often under the
banner of expressed appreciation for the appropriate limits on judicial
function. We are again, at least ~stensibly,'~
in a retreat phase. Yet this
retreat is marked by a quarrelsomeness in relation to Congress, a skepticism about its instructions, that should signal to us that not only judicial modesty is in the air. Professions abound that the courts should act
as faithful servants of Congress in interpreting statutes, for example;
yet one overhearing the conversations between master and servantseeing how they bicker, how uninterested the servant appears to be in
the context within which its master issued its instructions, how insistent
it is on deploying its own sense of syntax-could wonder just how
"faithful" is the service being rendered.14
While strong-minded judges and debates over the propriety of judicial activism are hardly a new phenomenon, all courts today-state as
well as federal-face three linked challenges that put our common-law
suppositions about judicial process under considerable stress. These are
the increasingly statutory character of law, the proliferation of legal
issues, and the explosion of judicial dockets. We could see a number of
linked results from these challenges: a heightening of judicial discretion
over what issues get decided; an emphasis on law-making rather than
case-deciding as the basis on which this discretion gets exercised; a
dramatically lowered exposure of trial and intermediate courts to prinSupreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL
L. REV.328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN.
L. REV.87 (2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factjinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKEL.J. 1169 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We
the Court. 115 HARV.
L. REV.1 (2001) (all discussing cases such as City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
12. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM.L.
REV. 1 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr.. All About Work: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM.L. REV. 990 (2001); John F.
Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM.L. REV.
1648 (2001).
13. I am not the only Commentator to find a remarkable activism in the current phase. In the
sense that the Court is essentially dismissive of settled expectations, either of the legal community or of the legislature, in pursuing its own vision of the proper state of the law. See, e.g.. T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain

Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV.687 (1992); Kramer, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., FRANCIS
LIEBER, LEGALAND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS
28-32 (1839); Peter
L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 225 (1999); Estate of Reynolds
v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470,475 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
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cipled public correction; and a temptation for the high court, then, to
speak in simple terms it might expect to have broad impact rather than
respond to the subtle particulars of complex facts. I want just briefly to
set these challenges and their results before you, and then turn to some
recent Supreme Court decisions that may illustrate the troubles, and
shed some light on Justice Scalia's Sandoval claim.
There are many important differences between today's courts and
those the Framers might have imagined-our very ideas about such matters as precedent and stare decisis, as Judge Alex Kozinski pointed out
in an interesting opinion published last month,15 owe a great deal to
conventions about the writing and publication of opinions that did not
emerge until the nineteenth century. Among the most important of these
differences, in my judgment, is the conversion of appellate review into
a discretionary exercise substantially controlled, for its own ends, by
the reviewing court.16 We have conferred on the judiciary's highest levels essentially free choice when to act, and our expectations are that
they will choose with reference to law-making rather than a party's
claim to justice. Whether we imagine judicial lawmaking as secondary
or primary, these changes transform and deeply challenge the rationales
we have for tolerating it.
Prior to this century, to the extent people understood that courts independently shaped the law, they would have understood that this function-what we can call the common law function-emerged from the
necessity to decide cases according to reason driven by party fact.17
This was a passive function, a corollary of the obligation to decide,
according to reason, any matters that parties put before them. One
looked first to established principle, to the force of stare decisis; if existing law did not control, the court still had to decide-and the absence
of controlling principle did not entail an automatic judgment for defendant. Rather, the court was then to look to considerations of justicewhat analogy to the established structures of law best fit the facts on
which the court was compelled to render a decision-and of policy-

--

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges' Bill. 100 COLUM.L. REV. 1643 (2000).
17. John Stuart Mill stated:
[A] Court of Justice acting as such . . does not declare the law eo nomine and in
the abstract, but waits until a case between man and man is brought before it judicially involving the point in dispute: from which arises the happy effect that . .
the Court decides after hearing the point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of
reputation, decides only s o much of the question at a time as is required by the
case before it, and its decision . is drawn from it by the duty which it cannot refuse to fulfill, of dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants.
JOHNSTUARTMILL, Considerations on Representative Government (1861). reprinted In
J.S. MILL. UTILITARIANISM.
ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS
ON REPRESENTATIVE
G O V E R N ~ ~ 403
E N T(H.B.Acton ed.. J.M. Dent & Sons 1972).
15.
16.

.

.

..
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what outcome would best govern future cases that the court could imagine following upon this one, once decision in the pending matter had
acquired precedential force. The obligation to decide not only excused
the judicial presumption in lawmaking-new law was merely and unavoidably its byproduct, the preferable alternative to automatically dismissing claims not previously provided for-but the obligation to decide
also gave the polity some assurance against programmatic judicial lawmaking. The parties chose the disputes, not the courts; the necessary
force of the court's decision was limited to the material facts of the case
before it; the facts of the next case, uncontrollable by the judges, might
well compel a conclusion looking in quite the opposite direction from
its predecessor. Common law development was in this sense the product of an invisible hand, if you like, that ineluctably provided corrections to doctrinal drift in one direction by generating the facts and disputes that would illustrate its dangers. The "work of modification,"
Benjamin Cardozo remarked in his famous lectures on The Nature of
the Judicial Process, "goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be measured by decades and even centuries. Thus measured, they are seen to
have behind them the power and the pressure of the moving glacier."'*
They grow out of repeated exposures to fact and perspective, exposures
over which the judiciary had little control.
Justice Holmes, in an oft-cited dissenting passage, framed this understood authority in a way that highlighted its subsidiary character:

I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate,
but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from
molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could not say
I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense
and shall not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of
the common-law rules of master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.lg
The necessity of the case, within the pre-existing general framework,
set the confines within which judges could act and, in acting, further
confine those whose judgment would follow after theirs.
How different the judicial function has become since the Judges'
Bill created a power to choose which matters our highest court would
hear! Decision is no longer a necessity, nor new law merely its byproduct. A court with certiorari authority is not merely able, but is expected, to choose its targets with reference to what law seems most
-

18. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Lecture I. Introduction. The Method of Philosophy, in THE
NATURE
OF THE JUDICIALPROCESS
25 (1921).
19. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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important to enunciate. Having thousands of petitions from which to
select, say, one hundred controversies for decisionz0 enables judges to
have agendas. It encourages them to speak more broadly than the particular facts before them require, counsel against that as we may.2' It
permits them to defend themselves against the inconvenience of facts
that might appear to compel movement opposite to the direction they
prefer. And, thus, it inevitably heightens our sense that in appointing
judges we are appointing lawmakers and should be concerned with the
kind of law they are likely to make. Freed from the discipline of the
unavoidable call of justice, lured by the opportunity, perhaps even felt
as responsibility, to speak broadly, the judge can shape her agenda as
she chooses. We are used to this in litigants, but not in judges. Even at
intermediate levels of review, where appeal is a matter of right, the
realities of opinion-writing and publication-eighty percent of decisions
are rendered essentially invisible to any but the immediate partiesentail similar possibilities and effects.22
Not often are the courts as candid about their power as was the
New York Court of Appeals when it cemented for New York the
change in tort law George Priest has characterized as a "radical overturn of 300 years of civil jurisprudence."" Its opinion opened with this
remarkable sentence:
We granted leave to appeal in order to take another step toward
a complete solution of the problem partially cleared up in [two
prior cases, both of which were decided after the making of the
orders being appealed from].24
While such candor is not often seen, and in this common law context
the New York legislature could have corrected the court had it wished
to, the state of mind toward judicial function thus revealed is strikingly
different from what we ordinarily assume in rationalizing judicial development of the common law.
The limitations on decision at the highest courts not only tend to
highlight their lawmaking function, but also threaten the viability of the
context-specific techniques of common-law reasoning. Dockets have
swollen, and legal questions multiplied, but not the institutions respon20.
21.

See The Statistics, 115 HARV.L. REV. 539, 539-50 (2001).
See CASSR. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASEAT A TIME10-11, 209-43 (1999); C ~ S Sunstein,
S
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided. 110 HARV.L. REV. 4 (1996).
22. Compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). vacated as moot on
reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.

2001).
L. REV.
23. George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO
2301.2302 (1989).
24. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.. 12 N.Y.2d 432,434 (1963).
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sible for managing them. Thus, the very changes that called forth the
certiorari function have strong implications for the Supreme Court's
possibility of generating coherence in the legal order, or effectively
controlling the actions of lower courts. Questions arising under any one
of the dozens of complex federal statutory schemes, with enormous
financial or social consequences, will not be heard even once a year; no
familiarity with that statute and its administration will result. A circuit
judge who might have expected his written opinions to gain the Court's
attention three times a year when the Judges' Bill was enacted today
must know that this will occur, on average, less often than once in
three years." We head towards one law for the Ninth Circuit, another
for the Third. The Justices of the Supreme Court, then, face a considerable temptation to follow Justice Scalia into relatively simple, eitheror, bright-line rules-approaches that avoid the rich contextualism and
modesty of classic common law reasoning, yet might from the Court's
perspective seem to promise control over adventurism in the lower
echelons of the federal judiciary.26
Thus, we might think courts-and not just federal courts-ought to
be thought of in contemporary terms, certainly in terms transformed
from what the Framers might have imagined. That rethinking is perhaps
especially called for in constitutional contexts, where the Supreme
Court's voice tends to exclude the possibility of dialogue with Congress. You will want to read Professor Larry Kramer's important
Foreword to the November issue of the Harvard Law Review," that I
had the privilege to read as a paper he delivered to my faculty this September. But my interest is at the more mundane level of ordinary lawfederal and state statutes, regulations, and the common law. Here, what
the courts do, legislatures can undo, and one can fairly imagine the
continuing processes that engage Congress, the agencies and the courts
as a kind of continuing dialogue. If not in the world of a century ago,
in today's statute and agency-dominated world, we can fairly characterize the judicial role in this dialogue as secondary-yet it is not absent,
and it is here that Justice Scalia's trenchant observation intrigues me. If
in the constitutional context, as Professor Kramer argues, the Court's
approach essentially excludes Congress from having a voice, in this
more ordinary setting it appears to be denying its own law-generating
c~mpetence.~~
25. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifry Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.L. REV.
1093 (1987).
26. Frederick Schauer. Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231.
27. See Kramer, supra note 11.
28. See id. at 134-36.M y thanks to ~rofessorKramer for suggesting this striking link be-
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Let me start by putting in front of you a formulation that contrasts
with Justice Scalia's, framed by Justice Robert Jackson in the immediate wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. T~mpkins~~-one
of those few cases I
think I can mention without having to tell you about it, at least for the
moment:
The federal courts have no general common law, as in a
sense they have no general or comprehensive jurisprudence of
any kind, because many subjects of private law which bulk
large in the traditional common law are ordinarily within the
province of the states and not of the federal government. But
this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to decide a
federal question which cannot be answered from federal statutes
alone we may not resort to all of the source materials of the
common law or that when we have fashioned an answer it does
not become a part of the federal non-statutory or common law. .
. . Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system
would be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of
attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from
the terms of the Constitution itself.30
For Justice Jackson, the field on which the Court might play was indeed
a function of federal authority. In contrast to state law, federal law is
invariably interstitial and so cannot be "general." Yet that does not
render federal courts special "tribunals," different in their nature from
the common law courts of the states. "Were we bereft of the common
law, our federal system would be imp~tent."~'
I mean to speak principally this afternoon about the little-noticed
majority and dissenting opinions in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., I ~ C .a, recent
~ ~ 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court. Three of the
four dissenting Justices in Geier also dissented from Sandoval, and so
did not subscribe to that majority's "federal tribunals" characterization.
Yet their Geier dissent seemed strongly to express the same sentiment,
that federal judges and state judges are different in kind.33 That is
where we will spend most of our remaining time. Before turning to
Geier, however, I want first briefly to set before you some other illustrations of this problem, to set its context.
One, about which I have previously written, is the Supreme Court's
tween our papers.
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
31. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., 315 U.S. at 470.
32. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
33. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886-913 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver.34 The question in the lower courts had been how to understand
Central Bank's possible liability for aiding and abetting others' violations of SEC Rule lOb(5) in a private action First Interstate had brought
under the authority of that rulee3' The possibility of private actions under Rule lOb(5) had long been e ~ t a b l i s h e d For
. ~ ~ at least sixteen years,
the SEC had been bringing enforcement actions against alleged aiders
and abetters; all eleven circuit courts of appeal to face the question had
also sustained private actions against aiders and abetters; Congress had
thoroughly revised the securities statutes without any question being
raised about this de~elopment.~'In the certiorari process seeking Supreme Court review, as well, the papers suggested no issue on this
score. In a common law world, one would say the issue of aider and
abettor liability had come to rest. The Supreme Court, however,
reached out and asked for argument on the question; it then decided, on
the basis of its conclusions about what the 1934 Congress had enacted,
that aider and abettor liability could not be sustained.38 That judgment
about the understanding of the Congress in 1934 might have been right
or it might have been wrong. Justice Stevens, writing in dissent for four
Justices, plausibly argued that the majority's interpretation was, to say
the least, "anachronistic. "39
What I want to call to attention to for present purposes is the
Court's striking independence in reaching out for an issue that the parties had not raised, yet which served an agenda reflected in many decisions of the current majority, most recently Sandoval itself: that of subordinating private actions for the enforcement of federal regimes, that
have not been directly provided for by statute. The Court used its certiorari prerogative to serve its own policy ends. And, as in Sandoval,
those ends were to deny conventional common law moves to federal
courts-and
thus to terminate any sense of continuing legislative/executive/judicial conversation about the development of law, any
sense of partnership in which courts provisionally work toward integrat i ~ n . ~In' the Central Bank majority's contemplation, statutes and regu34. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and
Common Law. 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429.
35. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
36. Id. at 171.
37. Id. at 169-77.
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. It is important to distinguish between the proposition that it is improper on, as it were,
separation of power grounds for federal courts to infer a remedy Congress has not provided for,
and the conclusion that a particular statutory scheme signals by its complexity, or by the judgments that have apparently been made, that it would be inappropriate to infer such a remedy for
that statute. See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984). A standard judicial
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lations are static texts-subject to future development only by the legislature or executive, yet to be accorded meaning by courts applying their
own and rather independent syntactic views.41
This want of sensitivity and attention to the possibilities of integration is suggested by an opinion from the Term just ended. Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff4' presented questions of preemption of state law by federal,
another context where one might expect the fact-driven and cautious
processes of the common law to dominate. David Egelhoff died intestate just two months after finalizing his divorce from his wife Donna.
Under the terms of their settlement, she had received a business, an
IRA account, and stock; he had retained 100% ownership of his pension and life insurance under his employer's plan. That plan was subject to ERISA, the federal statute regulating retirement plans. He had
neglected to redesignate the beneficiaries under these benefits, so that
when he died the primary beneficiary named in his policy remained
"Donna Egelhoff wife."43 A Washington state statute provided for this
contingency; in such a case, it said, non-probate assets should pass as if
the divorced spouse had predeceased the decedent. Thus, they would go
to his secondary beneficiaries under the plan, his children.44 ERISA, on
the other hand, states that the federal statute "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."45 Acknowledging that the operative terms, "relate
to," were so indefinite as to threaten infinite preemption of state law,
Justice Thomas's majority opinion nonetheless found that a state rule
specifying a beneficiary other than the one mentioned in the plan would
unacceptably burden plan administrators and so must be regarded as
preempted.46
It is striking that the majority, whose members have generally been
so solicitous of state interests, gave the federal statute such broad
sweep. As Justice Breyer's dissent observed, Washington law would be
permitted to govern if Donna had actually predeceased David (or had
murdered him); there is no necessary conflict with the federal statute;
the injustice of the result commanded by the majority opinion is transparent; and it interferes with state judgments in contexts, those of inheritance and the consequences of marital dissolution, that are of cenmove, which until rather recently a member of Congress would have had every reason to expect,
might indeed be inappropriate in particular circumstances, but that is not the voice of these
opinions.
41. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177; cf. United States v. Mead Corp.. 533 U.S. 218. 23961 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
43. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 n.2.
44. Id. at 144-45.
45. Id. at 146 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 5 1144(a) (1994)).
46. Id. at 150.
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tral importance to state and not federal poli~y.~'It is virtually inconceivable that Congress would have chosen this outcome. The plan contained express provisions naming David's children as beneficiaries if
his beneficiary designation was invalid-and making the designation
invalid was what state law accomplished. The majority's response to
these arguments was to advance highly improbable hypotheticals that, it
asserted, could not be distinguished in principle from the case at hand.
Even acknowledging the indeterminacy of the statutory language, it is
as if they feared acknowledging any responsibility for reconciling state
and federal law for themselves; it must all be placed in the lap of Congress or, rather, Congress's language as the judges chose to read it. For
the dissent, the better course would be to "apply[] pre-emption analysis
with care, statute by statute, line by line, in order to determine how
best to reconcile a federal statute's language and purpose with federalism's need to preserve state autonomy."48 For the majority, perhaps
conscious of the implications of their capacity to control the actions of
lower courts, the development of a common law on the subject was not
to be trusted.
The last preliminary case I'd like to mention before turning to Geier
is Rogers v. Tenne~see,~'
a case notable here less for its result than for
Justice Scalia's planting of what appear to be seeds for future developments along this line.50 Wilbert Rogers stabbed James Bowdery in the
heart in 1994; surgery to repair the wound failed to prevent Bowdery's
immediate loss of mental function and lapse into a coma from which he
could not be expected to recover.'' However, Bowdery was maintained
on life support for fifteen months until a kidney infection carried him
away, and so he did not die within a year-and-a-day of the ~tabbing.'~
A
1907 case had described death within a year-and-a-day as a commonlaw element of second degree murder, the offense of which Rogers was
~ description need not have been taken as
convicted in state c o ~ r t s . 'That
47. Id. at 153-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 1GO (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
50. One critic has stated that:
Justices . . . with agendas which go beyond the just resolution of current cases are
likely to plant seeds in opinions which can be nourished and made to bloom in later
cases. The common law concept of dicta aims to inhibit and thwart such ploys. Accepted legal methodology instructs that general expressions in judicial opinions are
to be geared back to the specific case facts which generated them. The problem is
that judges who are willing to plant language in their opinions for future fruition
will disrespect these methodological constraints, including the fact that the language appeared in a dissent, when it suits their purpose in a future case.
Richard Cappelli, A Legal Method Look at Rogers v . Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. I693 (2000). at
http:llwww.angelfire.comlpa4/cappallilanalysis.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
51. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 454.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 455 (quoting Percer v. State, 103 S.W. 780 (Tenn. 1907)).
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h~lding.'~
A 1989 statute had abolished common law defenses in the
state, and might have been taken to abrogate this rule." Yet the Tennessee Supreme Court found' that Tennessee law did encompass such a
rule, and that it had survived that statutory change. Acting, then, in a
common law mode, it found the rationale for the rule had lapsed, and
so overruled it.'6 In this context, with the year-and-a-day rule definitively established as having been a part of Tennessee law on the dates
both of the stabbing and of Bowdery's death, the question for the Supreme Court was whether abrogation of the rule deprived Rogers of due
process of law, given its retrospective effect and the explicit constitutional prohibition on ex post facto legi~lation.'~Could a common law
court make law, in this respect, in ways that a legislature could not?
I hold no brief for Justice OYConnor'sconclusion, for a group identifiable as the five middle Justices of the Court, that Tennessee could
constitutionally effect this change to Rogers' detriment." Claims of
unfairness arising from the characteristic retrospectivity of changes in
the common law are often properly answered by arguments denying
proper reliance-that one ought to have seen this change ~ o m i n g , 'or
~
that knowledge of the change could not be imagined to have affected
the behavior ~oncerned.~'The persuasiveness of these answers in the
particular case of the criminal law does not turn on the Ex Post Facto
Clause alone. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer and Stevens-an unusual
quartet-strongly dissented. What caught my eye in relation to today's
talk was that Justice Scalia took the occasion for a lengthy disquisition
on the proposition that, as a historical matter, the authors of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause would not have thought common law
judges had the "power to change the common law."61 The discussion is
hedged with qualifiers; both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, to vary-.
ing degrees, distance themselves from it even so. Yet the remarkable
fact is that it is there at all. It would not have been hard to dissent
without it.
One senses here the further building of an argument, by one who
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Rogers. 532 U.S. at 455.

Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 466-67.
Cf.SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
60. It is inconceivable that the wielder of a butcher knife inflicting numerous deep wounds
would or could so calculate a stab penetrating his victim's heart, meaning to cause death (a remaining element of the offense for which Rogers was convicted), that would not cause that death
until more than a year-and-a-day had lapsed.
61. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia does not indicate why he
takes late eighteenth century (Fifth Amendment) rather than nineteenth century (Fourteenth
Amendment) readings of judicial function to be controlling.
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professes no judicial authority to make law, for radical change in our
conception of what it means to be a court-or, at the least, a "federal
tribunal." Justice Scalia conceded that the new American courts, that
had so recently freed themselves from the English yoke, "felt themselves perfectly free to pick and choose which parts of the English
common law they would adopt."62 One of the great early figures of
American law, Chancellor James Kent, describing his self-conception in
late eighteenth century New York, wrote that:

I took the court as if it had been a new institution, & never before known to the U.S. I had nothing to guide me, & was left at
liberty to assume all such English chancery powers and jurisdiction as I thought applicable . . . . This gave me great scope, & I
was only checked by the revision of the Senate, and Court of
Errors. . . . My practice was first to make myself perfectly &
accurately. . . master of the facts. . . . I saw where justice lay
and the moral sense decided the cause half the time, & I then
sed [sic] down to search the authorities until I had exhausted my
books, & I might once & [sic] a while be embarrassed by a
technical rule, but I most always found principles suited to my
views of the case.63
One would hardly suggest that judges of the time felt free to adopt any
rule they chose; the system and broadly stated principles of the common
law required adherence, even as the judge accommodated them to the
particular facts before him and to changing social circ~mstance.~"
Yet
Justice Scalia's way of putting it appears to threaten these common law
functions of dynamic accommodation and change, at least for "federal
tribunalsn-even at Justice Holmes' level of the molecular. The argument being built, the agenda apparently being pursued, is stunning indeed.
Now at last let us turn to Geier v. American H~nda.~'
This case was
a minor event in the Supreme Court's 1999 October Term, yet a curious one in several respects. Ms. Geier had been driving her 1987
Honda, using the manual lap and shoulder belts with which it came
equipped, when she ran her car into a tree.@She suffered injuries more
62. Id.
63. Letter from James Kent to a correspondent in Tennessee, in 1 SELECTESSAYSIN
ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGALHISTORY
837, 844-45 (1907) (emphasis omitted).
64. One readily understands in this way Judge Kent's contemporaneous refusal to reach a
conclusion he knew judges of the continent would reach but that he could not reconcile with the
premises of the common law, although "if the question was res integra in our law, I confess I
should be overcome by the reasoning of the Civilians." Seixas v. Woods. 2 Cai. R. 48, 55 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1804).
65. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
66. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
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serious, she claimed, than she would have suffered had the Honda been
equipped with a driver's side airbag (or other equally safe and effective
passive restraint device).67 The question presented was whether Honda
could be held liable in a product liability action at common law for this
failure to equip its product with a readily avaiIabIe safety device.68
Honda was in compliance with the then operative federal regulatory
standard on passive restraint devices, which required that it equip only
ten percent of its fleet with passive restraint devices (not necessarily
airbags); it had done so, but by equipping cars other than the one Ms.
Geier happened to
Whether that compliance with federal standards operated to shield it from possible liability under the ordinary tort
law of the jurisdiction required, inter alia, understanding two provisions of the federal statute in evident tension with one another.
Under 15 U.S.C. 5 1392(d):
[wlhenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established
under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal ~tandard.~'
Under 15 U.S.C. 5 1397(k), however, "[c]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law."71 Nine Justices agreed that neither state legislative nor state executive authority
could adopt requirements for vehicle safety differing from federal standards-that under the first of these provisions, state lawmaking on a
subject otherwise easily within reach of state authority had been suspended." But judicial law-making power, it appeared, was reserved;
67. The majority writes as if the claim was specifically that the Honda lacked an airbag; the
dissent reiterates, with a citation to the joint appendix, that Ms. Geier's complaint was about the
absence of any effective and safe "passive restraint system . . 'including, but not limited to.
airbags.'" that might have reduced her injuries from those she suffered. Id. at 902 n.18 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Because she was wearing a buckled manual lap and shoulder belt at the time of
the accident, it is hard to imagine that the alternative passive restraint devices that had been
demonstrated to meet the requirements of Standard 208 at the time, automatic seat belts, would
have been any more effective in preventing her injury than the manual devices she in fact used.
While room was left for the development of alternative, cheaper and safer passive restraint systems in the Standard, nothing at the time (or in subsequent developments) suggests that this
opportunity had been availed of by any manufacturer.
68. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874.
69. Id. at 881.
70. 15 U.S.C. 8 1392(d) (1988).
71. 15 U.S.C. 5 1397(k) (1988).
72. See Geier. 529 U.S. at 861; id. at 896 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
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and on the implications of this reservation the Court divided 5-4.
For the majority, Justice Breyer writing, the savings clause served
only to preclude automatic preemption of common law a ~ t h o r i t y In
.~
adopting any given standard, the Secretary could indicate special circumstances that would preclude a particular, conflicting state common
law rule.74 If the Secretary did not do so, the courts might nonetheless
be able to find a disabling confli~t.'~
Such a conflict was established, in
this case, by the Secretary's affirmative wish to require only gradual
deployment of passive restraint devices.76 A common law standard of
care imposing a universal obligation to equip cars with such devices
would necessarily conflict with a federal standard that attached affirmative importance to gradualism, and so, the Court held, could not sur~ i v e Note
. ~ that, as neither Congress nor the Secretary had made this
judgment, the majority was, necessarily, asserting a law-making authority in the federal courts-corresponding roughly to the law-making authority the courts have exercised in "dormant Commerce Clause" cases
excluding various state regulatory measures for conflict with interstate
commerce.
For the minority, Justice Stevens writing, "[tlhis is a case about
federalism," about the respect owed state courts' law-making powers.78
Acknowledging that Congress or the Secretary might have excluded
state judges (as well as state executives and state legislatures) from acting in ways inconsistent with federal regulations, the minority stressed
that this had not happened.79 Federal courts, it argued, could not appropriately develop the law in such a setting; they had necessarily to await
instructions from the other branches, lest the traditional powers of state
courts to create law be impinged.80Justice Stevens' opinion invokes the
specter of unelected "federal judges . . . running amok" with authority
that can be appropriately entrusted only to elected representative^.^'
The curiosities in the case are several. The majority for whom Justice Breyer wrote comprised the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy,
07Connor and ~calia;'' the minority, in addition to Justice Stevens,
73. Geier. 529 U.S. at 869-70.
74. Id. at 870.
75. Id. at 874.
76. Id. at 879.
77. Id. at 881.
78. Geier, 529 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).
79. Id. at 888.
80. Id. at 907-10.
81. Id. at 907.
82. In 1988, Justice Scalia was the author of Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988). that in effect extended to defense contractors the benefit of the "discretionary function"
exemption from tort liability Department of Defense officials would enjoy under the Federal
Torts Claims Act, for specifying design elements in military equipment that a court might other-
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included Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Thomas. Usual lines of division,
whether the broad liberal-conservative scale, or attachment to "federalism" as an important issue for the Court in other contexts, do not appear.
Strikingly, for all the dissenting talk about the importance of the
States and the traditional state common law function, as a technical
matter, this was not a case about conflict between federal and state law.
While no Justice thought it significant enough to address, Alexis
Geier's accident occurred in the District of Columbia. The common law
developed there is federal common law,83its judges are federal judges,
as were the common law and the judges of the federal territories. Of
course it might as easily have been Maryland or Virginia. But it was
not. The constitutional status of the District of Columbia-for example,
in respect of the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that states assure equal protection of the laws-has long been a challenge, perhaps
best swept under the carpet as here. The habit of regarding the District
as a state might even redound, one day, to the benefit of its citizens.
What these curiosities may do is direct our attention to the possibility that the real stakes here too have less to do with federalism than
with the question whether our national courts are courts in the same
sense as are local courts-those in the states and those in the District of
Columbia alike. Whether the federal airbag standard and the local
common law rule being argued for were in such conflict that the two
could not stand was, undoubtedly, a federal question. As that question
had not been answered by Congress or by the Secretary of Transportation, it had to be answered by the federal courts. Federal judicial lawmaking-the judicial articulation of a controlling federal standard-the
dissent argued, would be inappropriate, because local judicial lawmaking-the only kind of local lawmaking that remained even arguably
available given Section 1392(d)~~-isso imp~rtant.~'
Judicial lawmaking
- -

wise find to have been defectively (negligently) designed. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. Over the
dissents of the liberal wing of the Court as it then was, he found "uniquely federal interests," id.
at 505, warranting a uniform national rule to assess the possible liability of defense contractorsfederal common law-and significant conflict between those ieterests and the operation of state
law, id. at 507, if the design the federal government affirmatively required could be made the
source of manufacturer liability for defective design. Justice Brennan, for Justices Blackmun and
Marshall, dissented essentially on Erie grounds. Justice Stevens dissented on the basis of p ~ d e n tial concerns that in balancing "the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive
governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual . . . we should defer to
the expertise of the Congress." Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Neither Justice Scalia nor
Justice Stevens identified any special institutional characteristic of "federal tribunals" (beyond
their federal status) that made it likely they would be less able than their state counterparts to
generate common law reasoning and outcomes in the traditional manner.
83. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
84. 15 U.S.C. 0 1392(d) (1988).
85. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in local judges is of central importance, even when other forms of lawmaking are forbidden to local authorities. Judicial lawmaking in federal
judges is suspect, and it raises the specter of judges run amok, even
when invoked in aid of detailed law created by other, legitimate lawmakers. A certain tension is evident between these two propositions.
Discussions of the common law authority of federal courts are conventionally framed by Sw@ v. son'^ and Erie R.R. v. ~orn~kins.*'
The
rich literature appearing under their influence has invoked considerations of federalism, separation of powers, (relatedly) democratic principles, and changing conceptions about the nature of the common law to
derive theoretical structures for this question.88 The spectre of judges
who might run amok has a distinguished political history in this country, most prominently in relation to constitutional law (where the legislature is not available to control their running) but also in respect of
judicial attitudes towards statutory interpretation and statutory intrusions on judge-made law, and also the common-law function simpliciter. Both constitutional and prudential concerns can be imagined to
underlay these concerns: constitutional concerns about whether courts
are permitted to be lawmakers in contradistinction to legislatures; and
prudential concerns about the relative merits of legislative and judicial
lawmaking, supposing the latter is permitted to occur.
Whether federal courts are permitted to be lawmakers might seem
to have been settled, as Justice Jackson argued, by the Constitution's
creation of a judiciary in the familiar English mold and reference in
constitutional text to such common law concepts as the sanctity of cont r a c t ~ To
. ~ ~be sure, the Constitution vests in Congress "all legislative
Powersm-that is, the power to enact freestanding statutes having the
force of law. Courts uncontroversially lack any such power (save possibly an inherent authority to adopt rules of procedure to control their
own business). Yet the common law system of precedent and stare de86. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
87. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88. E.g., TONY FREYER,HARMONY
& DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1981); EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDE~S
AND THE PROGRESSIVE
COURTSIN
CONSTITUTION:
ERIE.THE JUDICIAL POWER,AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.L. REV. 881 (1986); William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance. 97
HARV.L. REV. 1513 (1984); Henry J. Friendly. In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law. 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Larry Kramer, The La~vmakingPower of the
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill. The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan. Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law. 89 HARV.L. REV. 1 (1975).
89. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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cisis just as uncontroversially permits judges to find duties that they
enforce against the parties-duties that the parties could not have found
in the law before they acted-and the system as a whole enforces a
whole range of duties that draw their legal force only from accumulated
judicial pronouncements. Thus, one might suppose that the constitutional description of judicial power, extending to "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority,"" imagined that the federal courts Congress could create to exercise that power would be courts in the ordinary understanding-that is,
common law courts or equity courts of that time, before the universal
mergers of the twentieth century.
I risk here, as others have before me, a certain anachronism. For
contemporary eyes, it is hard to escape the conclusion that courts make
law when they enforce a duty or require adherence to a construction
that was not previously certain, and the operation of stare decisis assures that this conclusion will be projected into future controversies.
Further, we think of that law in positivistic terms-it is the law of New
York, or Alabama, or the United States. As William Fletcher among
others has shown,91 in the early years of the Republic, federal (and
other) courts acted as common law courts without necessary attention
(save where "local law" was clearly on point) to the question which
sovereign's law they were enunciating; what Holmes would later dismiss as a brooding omnipresence in the sky, the universality of this
body of general principle was what made their work uncontroversial."
Only when they had to tie the common law to the law of a particular
jurisdiction did controversy arise; if federal courts could deploy the
common law to define federal crimes, what would keep Congress
within the limited law-making authority the Constitution had conferred?93But in the midst of the disputes over states rights and slavery
30. U.S. CONST.art. 111, 8 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
91.

Fletcher. supra note 88.

32. See id. at 1515.
93. United States v. Hudson. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812). It seems unnecessary for
these purposes to delve into the debates among William Crosskey and others over the precise
extent to which common law and jurisdiction were tied. Crosskey finds in early history an understanding that federal common law could control state common law. See WILLIAMWINSLOW
CROSSKEY.POLITICSA N D THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITEDSTATES641-937
(1953). His work attracted extended critical responses from some distinguished reviewers that
would be an understatement to call insulting. See, e.g.. Ernest J. Brown, Book Review 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1439 (1954); Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex pane Cfio, 54 COLUM.L. REV. 450 (1954) (book
review); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HARV.L. REV. 1457
(1954) (book review). Yet the passages on federal common law expectations seem to have escaped these attacks, and drew praise from other distinguished commentators. See, e.g., GRANT
GILMORE,THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW117 n.3 (1977); Irving Brandt, Mr. Crosskey and Mr.
Madison, 54 COLUM.L. REV. 443, 450 (1954) (book review); Charles E. Clark, Professor
Crosskey and the Brooding Ominpresence of Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 24. 31 (1953)
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that would become the Civil War, Justice Story could write of universal
principles of common law in Swift v. Tysong4without provoking that
concern. Federal courts were indisputably, uncontroversially common
law courts, acting as all such courts did to enunciate principle even during those times-Llewellyn's Golden Age or Gilmore's Age of Discoveryg5-when they quite clearly understood that their task was accommodating general law, never expressed by anyone but judges, to the realities of a new continent and a new age.%
Similarly, the laws creating the District of Columbia simply established them as having cognizance of "all cases in law and equity.""
Congress provided for the continuance in effect of the laws of the states
from which the District was created, Virginia and Maryland, "until
Congress shall otherwise by law pr~vide,"~'
but never seems to have
thought it necessary to free the east and west banks of the Potomac
from the need to follow developing explications of the common law in
Richmond and Annapolis, respectively; while heeding those jurisdictions' constructions of statutes the District thus inherited," the D.C.
courts appear to have made their common law their own.'00 While Professor Fletcher reports early attention to the fact of these directions, his
account also makes clear that the federal courts sitting on the Virginia
(and, one supposes, Maryland) side of the Potomac felt no inhibition
following their own views of the best rule, where the lex loci was not
involved. lo'
(book review); Arthur L. Corbin, Book Review, 62 YALEL.J. 1137 (1953); Grant Gilmore. The
Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 475. 485
(1972); Malcolm Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 440 (1954). Morton J. Horwitz
suggests an awakening American realization that the common law was not a natural law artifact
to be discovered but the product of human reasoning by authorized lawmakers acting in particular
THE TRANSFORMATION
jurisdictions, that could be turned to social ends. MORTON J. HORWITZ,
OF AMERICAN
LAW1780-1860, at 1-30 (1977).
94. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
LAW12, 19-40 (1977).
GILMORE,
THEAGES OF AMERICAN
95. GRANT
96. The issue is not in my judgment settled by reference to the absence of a federal reception
statute, as was sometimes argued. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
discussed in GILMORE,
supra note 95, at 117 n.3, 121 n.22. If such a statute were necessary, it
would have been required for places where the common law had no connection to state authority,
yet Congress's performance in those contexts hardly exceeded in specificity the Constitution's
reference to "ail Cases in Law and Equity." U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1789 states only that the court whose appointment is provided for "shall have a
common law jurisdiction" and that the Territory's inhabitants "shall always be entitled to the
benefits of . . . judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." Northwest
Ordinance of 1789, 1 Stat. 50, 51-52. See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognitions and rhe
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 648-49 (1987).
97. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, 5 5, 2 Stat. 103, 106.
98. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, 5 1 , 2 Stat. 103, 103-05; Act of July 16, 1790, 5 1, 1 Stat. 130.
99. See, e.g., Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Clawans v. Sheetz,
92 F.2d 517, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
100. See Busby v. Elec. Utils. Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72, 74-75 (1944).
.
101. Fletcher, supra note 88, at 1534 n.103, 1541; see also id. at 1524-25, 1575 (exhibiting
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Neither of the attorneys in Swifr seemed to have thought that the
Court's common law authority was settled by earlier decisions. Their
arguments suggested three possibilities I want to put before you in
schematic f~rm'~~-first,that in the absence of federal statute, state
common law must control; second, the possibility we associate with the
case, that outside the realms of local matters and federal statutes, state
and federal courts shared a non-exclusive common law authority; and
third, that common law judgments properly articulated by the Supreme
Court independent of state common law--that is, within the reach of
federal lawmaking authority--would be among the "Laws . . . made,
under the Authority of the United States"'03 by which state court judges
would be bound.

Realm of
Common Law

I

1a

State common law

0

conlmls absent

State common
lawm,s
Shared common

federal statutes

law authority

Local allributes

0

Exclusive federal
legal authority

0

Exclusive
federal legal
authority

little concern for reception statutes or like formalities).
102. These diagrams make three assumptions: first, that the federal government has limited
legislative authority; second, that this limited authority overlaps, but neither completely subsumes nor is completely subsumed by, the fields within which state courts uncontroversially
might make common law; and, finally, that even if one were to allocate the realms within which
state courts make common law between "general" and "local" subjects, at least some of the
"general" subjects would fall outside the area of federal legislative competence. These propositions would surely have been agreed with in S~vijt'stime, although our expansive contemporary
notion of federal legislative competence makes them more uncertain today.
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Before reflexively dismissing the argument on the ground
that "Laws" in the Supremacy Clause must mean "statutes," and not the common law, the reader
should pause to consider that the same clause's "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding," id. (emphasis added), must certainly refer to the common
law and, indeed, that the same proposition underlies the Supreme Court's eventual reading of
"laws of the several states" in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to refer to state common,
as well as statutory, law as constituting the rules of decision in diversity cases. Judiciary Act of
1789, (i 34, 1 Stat. 73,92.
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State common

common law
controls

Note that it would not have been hard to conclude, although Justice
Story did not explicitly state, that the case was within Congress's lawmaking authority. It presented a standard problem of commercial law,
and Swift's attorney, hoping to avoid confronting defenses Tyson might
have made under New York law against those to whom he had made the
note, strongly argued a need for uniformity, grounded in the needs of
~
in the argument was our
interstate and foreign c ~ m m e r c e . 'Implicit
third possibility-that a federal rule, if proper, would control in the
same manner as federal admiralty law controlled the states, or the dormant commerce clause. The second possibility appears in the arguments
of Tyson's attorney, who argued as if, should the Court find authority
to develop a federal common law rule on the subject, that common law
rule, of necessity, would be only for the federal courts.105Because it
would have no authority over state courts, he argued, it would permit a
"perpetual confliction" between federal and possibly differing state law
rules.106The only proper conclusion, he argued, was that state law must
apply. lo'
The difference in premises might have seemed unremarkable to
anyone who had followed the political struggles of the preceding decades, but it has largely passed from view today. Justice Story wrote
Swiff as if he were addressing a natural field for national law. He discussed the commercial law issues in the case in a way that prominently
suggested Congress's ability to reach them under the clause empowering it to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. As a result, it was at
least open to future courts to discover that the capacity of federal courts
he was asserting had two qualities: first, that it was limited to matters
respecting which Congress had authority to legislate; second, that this
federal common law was binding on the s t a t e s 4 the same manner in
104.
105.
106.
107.

Swiftv. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 8-9 (1842).
S~vift,441 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 9-1 1.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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which a state's common law, on questions respecting which Congress
could not legislate, would control the decisions of the federal courts (or
the courts of any other state applying that law under conflicts of law
principles) to which it applied. This is the state of affairs illustrated by
the third diagram above: a limited domain for federal common law,
coextensive with federal legislqtive competence, and within which federal common law is controlling on all courts, federal and state.
The federal courts did not develop Swift in this way. Rather, they
took Swift to assert a privilege of the federal courts to declare "general" common law that was coordinate with the authority of the state
courts (save only distinctly "local" questions reserved exclusively to the
states); and over time the courts lost sight of any possible limitation of
this privilege to settings within Congress's legislative competence. The
brilliant recent scholarship of Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,lo8 describes as "the most pervasive and enduring achievement" of the late
nineteenth century Supreme Court its movement "to establish the primacy of the national judiciary" in just this way.Iog Justices like David
Josiah Brewer:
[rlepeatedly . . . voted to reaffirm the constitutional limitation
on congressional power [over the insurance industry], and just
as regularly he used the authority of the federal courts to make
general common law rules for insurance contracts.

....
. . . The Constitution gave Congress "no general grant of
legislative power" . . . . Conversely, Article I11 "granted the

entire judicial power of the Nation" to the federal courts, and
its charter was "not a limitation nor an enumeration." Rather,
Article I11 granted "all the judicial power which the new Nation
was capable of exercising." . . . Thus, he established a more
flexible and expansive test for judicial power than for legislative
power, necessarily broadening the reach of the former beyond
that of the latter."'
This led, notoriously, to the results catalogued at length by dissenters
and academics through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
those who could use the diversity jurisdiction were sometimes afforded
a choice of applicable law unavailable to other litigants; and federal
courts purported to have the right to declare federal law on questions
about which Congress could not legislate. Neither result was intellectually sustainable.
108. PURCELL,supra note 88.
103. Id. at 39.
110. Id. at 55, 58 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907)) (footnote omitted).
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Erie's dominant voice, its constitutional voice, is repudiation of
Justice Brewer's interpolation, "the power to declare rules of decision
which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes,"
permitting diversity parties an unjustifiable choice of law when the
"[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of
common law prevented uniformity.""' The fault lay both in the presumption of acting outside federal legislative power, and in the (corresponding) failure to make the federal rule exclusive. "In attempting to
promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the doctrine
had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the
state"'12 and, by empowering diversity parties to require decision on the
basis of otherwise inapplicable general federal common law, denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Just as Swij? was read to claim more for federal courts than could
properly be claimed, Erie can be read to disclaim more than it must-to
insist, in effect, on the situation of the first diagram above. The paragraph that contributes most to this understanding is perhaps the following:
Third. Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they
be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or
a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal ~ o u r t s . ' ' ~
Consider, for example, "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their
nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of
torts."'14 This sentence can only be understood as referring to a power
that could be independent of the legislative powers conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Congress had unhesitatingly declared such rules in contexts within reach of its power over
interstate commerce, as in Section 8 of the federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893-a provision subsequently expanded upon to simi-

111.
112.
113.
114.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,72,74 (1938).
Erie. 304 U.S. at 75.
Id. at 78.
Id.

Courts or Tribunals?
lar effect by the Federal Employers' Liability ~ c t : " '
That any employee of any such common carrier who may be injured by any locomotive, car, or train in use contrary to the
provision of this act shall not be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk thereby occasioned, although continuing in the
employment of such carrier after the unlawful use of such locomotive, car, or train had been brought to his kn~wledge."~
This provision is, transparently, addressed to the content of state common law as it would be applied in state court common law actions by
railroad employees against their railroad employers. In the Senate debates over this provision, questions were raised about Congress's constitutional authority to adopt such legislation, and answered in interstate
commerce terms.l17
Congress's constitutional authority for this measure is beyond ques-

115. 45 U.S.C. 80 51-60 (1994).
116. Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893, ch. 196, 5 5,27 Stat. 531, 532.
117. Congress's questions about its authority to adopt the legislation are evidence by the

following:
Mr. GRAY. I think there is a very serious objection to this amendment, and I have
doubt about the right of Congress, in regulating the instrumentalities of commerce,
to stretch its powers so as to regulate the contracts in every respect which may be
made with these people. I have enough doubt about it to control my vote.

....

Mr. President, this amendment seeks to introduce to every one of our forty-four
States an amendment to the common law of that State of a character more far
reaching than any which has ever been before attempted by Congress, s o far as I
can now recall, by one enactment. We undertake now to prescribe to the courts in
every State in this Union a rule in regard to negligence, a rule in regard to the liability of employers, and a rule in regard to the ordinary risk assumed by all persons who engage with their eyes open in certain employment, to be administered
not only by the courts of the United States, but by the courts of every State in this
country, whether that contravenes the policy of a State or not, whether, in the
opinion of its courts or in the policy adopted by its Legislature, such a rule be wise
or not. I believe that this exercise of power by Congress in this respect is unnecessary, and that there is no exigency demanding so far reaching and radical an exercise of power as would be made by this amendment if adopted. . . .

....

[Senator, later Chief Justice, Edward White responded:]
I wish to make a very brief statement, if it be in order. I entirely agree with the
constitutional view expressed by the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Gray], but I do
not think that constitutional view will operate to prevent me from voting for the
amendment, because if there be a class of contracts which, under the Constitution,
is not brought within the purview of this section by the operation of this proposed
law and the Constitution upon which it rests, then this proposed law will not affect
that class of contracts; but if there be a class of contracts which it is within our
constitutional power to legislate in reference to, then I think the provision will be a
wise one, and the legislation will be valid to the extent of its constitutionality, and
necessarily invalid wherever it extends beyond the limits of the Constitution.
24 CONG.REC. 1481 (1893).
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tion. In an obscure but remarkable de~ision,"~
Justice Holmes-Swift's
most vociferous critic-built on that authority to discover a federal
question authorizing Supreme Court review of a state court decision
ostensibly applying state common law. Although the decision was
closely divided on strongly held federalism grounds, with Justice
Brewer in dissent, no Justice questioned the constitutionality of the
statute, as none would today. A brakeman had been called upon to couple two railroad cars not equipped as the federal act required, under
highly dangerous circumstances, and died in the effort when he lifted
his head a bit too high between the cars as they came together.llg To his
widow's suit in state court for wrongful death damages, the railroad
counterposed a claim that he had been twice warned to keep his head
down and had been contributorily negligent.I2O The state courts, seeming to acknowledge the federal denial of "assumption of the risk" as a
defense, found contributory negligence in this behavior.12' For the four
Justices of the dissent, that ended the matter; the decision was one of
state law, presenting no federal question for the Court. "If an iron is
dangerously hot, and one knows that it is hot and is warned not to touch
it, and does touch it without any necessity therefor being shown, and is
thereby burned, it is trifling to say that there is no evidence of negligence."'" For Holmes, the Court was called upon to protect the policy
of the federal statute:
We cannot help thinking that . . . the ruling upon Schlemmer's
negligence was so involved with and dependent upon erroneous
views of the statute that if the judgment stood the statute would
suffer a wound.

....
. . . We are clearly of opinion that Schlemmer's

rights were
in no way impaired by his getting between the rails and attempting to couple the cars. So far he was saved by the provision that
he did not assume the risk. The negligence, if any, came later.
We doubt if this was the opinion of the court below. But suppose the nonsuit has been put clearly and in terms on Schlemmer's raising his head too high after he had been warned. Still
we could not avoid dealing with the case, because it still would
be our duty to see that his privilege against being held to have
assumed the risk of the situation should not be impaired by
holding the same thing under another name. If a man not intent
on suicide but desiring to live, is said to be chargeable with
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Schlemrner v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1906).
Schlemmer, 205 U.S. at 8-9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 15 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 18.
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negligence as matter of law when he miscalculates the height of
the car behind him by an inch, while his duty requires him, in
his crouching position, to direct a heavy drawbar moving above
him into a small slot in front, and this in the dusk, at nearly
nine of an August evening, it is utterly impossible for us to interpret this ruling as not, however unconsciously, introducing
the notion that to some extent the man had taken the risk of the
danger by being in the place at all.'=
So also, as has long been u n d e r ~ t o o d , 'the
~ ~ Erie paragraph's dismissive reference to "federal general common law,"'25 must be read in
the context of a case involving only diversity, and a question on which
the Court assumes Congress lacks Article I authority to 1egi~late.I~~
Within the area of Congress's legislative competence, neither the constitutional objection to federal common law making Justice Brandeis
invokes-that the Court could not act if Congress could not-nor the
injustices involved in having competing systems of law potentially applicable to the same dispute would present themselves. As in Schlemmer, what was "assumption of the risk" had become a federal question
from which Pennsylvania courts were not free to depart even by misnaming the basis for their action, federal common law within the area
of Congress's legislative competence would be exclusive. Prudential
questions might arise-suggestions that it would be preferable to await
the judgment of Congress-but these are quite distinct from any claim
that federal courts lack common-law authority; rather, they are reasons
not to use it.
Such reasons are hard to find in Geier. Consider either of two possible statements of a local common law rule that might have been applied to decide whether marketing a car without airbags or the like
amounted to marketing a car with a design defect. In the 1930s, in a
much admired and influential formulation, Learned Hand had written
that:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence [in equipping a boat]
is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure;
a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however
persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their uni123. Id. at 13-14.
124. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 88.
125. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
126. Presumably Congress might have legislated on the duty of care interstate railroads, in
particular, owed to pedestrians near their tracks; but the common-law proposition put was general, not one about special rules applicable to interstate railroads.
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versa1 disregard will not excuse their omission.'"
Much more recently, the American Law Institute proposed as its definition of "design defect" the following:
[A product] is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe.I2*
Both formulations constitute general common law tests, and one
readily imagines a court undertaking to apply them in the particular
context of automotive airbags as that technology was known at the time
question then becomes,
Honda designed its 1987 cars. The S~hlernrner'~~
whether federal judgments about the imperativeness of airbags (under
Judge Hand's test) or the reasonable safety of cars without them (under
the test articulated in the Restatement) are entitled to control. For the
majority, preserving the integrity of the federal regulatory judgments in
the particular instance overcomes the general saving of state common
law judgments; permitting a state court to find the airbags "imperative"
or their omission "not reasonably safe" in the face of the Secretary's
contrary judgment and her stated reasons for that would impermissibly
wound the strong federal policy for uniformity reflected in the clear
denials to state legislatures and executives of any possibility of taking
action inconsistent with the federal standards.
At one point in his opinion for the dissent, Justice Stevens remarks
that:
Before discussing the pre-emption issue, it is appropriate to note
that there is a vast difference between a rejection of Honda's
threshold arguments in favor of federal pre-emption and a conclusion that petitioners ultimately would prevail on their common-law tort claims. I express no opinion on the possible merit,
or lack of merit, of those claims. I do observe, however, that
even though good-faith compliance with the minimum requirements of Standard 208 would not provide Honda with a complete defense on the merits, I assume that such compliance
would be admissible evidence tending to negate charges of negligent and defective design. In addition, if Honda were ultimately found liable, such compliance would presumably weigh
127. The T.J. Hooper. GO F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
(THIRD) OF TORTS:PRODS.LIAB.3 2 (2000).
128. RESTATEMENT
129. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry. Co.. 205 U.S. 1 (1906).
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against an award of punitive darnages.130
In so writing, he apparently relies on Section 4 of the Third Restatement131--itself (for these purposes) a proposition about state common
law embodying no particular theory of federal-state relation^.'^^ Suppose that Ms. Geier's case were permitted to go forward, and Honda
sought a judicial ruling that, in the particular circumstances of Standard
208, the federal determination regarding "reasonableness" must be respected. To judge by earlier opinions,'33 at that point Justice Stevens
might agree that a federal question had been presented respecting the
"merit, or lack of merit, of those claims."'34 To give that question up,
in the presence of undoubted federal legislative authority and weakened
claims for state law (state legislative and executive action creating stand a r d ~ ' ~clearly
'
having been precluded) would be to dismember what the
redoubtable Holmes characterized as the central pillar of the federal
system.
Must the savings clause be understood, as the minority assumes, as
a strong recognition of the continuing law-making authority of state
courts, a blank check given them for whatever future developments they
might choose in the particular context of auto safety? One could suggest
alternative constructions that would not have raised the issues so troubling Justice Stevens.
First, it might have been read quite weakly: as a declaration by
Congress that no rights existing when it acted (that is, under the common law as it then was) should be found prejudiced by its action. This
130. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 892-93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnotes and citation omitted).
131. Section 4(b) provides that:
[A] product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but
such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:PRODS.LIAB. 5 4(b) (2000).
132. Comment e to Section 4(b), a kind of legislative history even the recent doubters of
legislative history on the Court have been willing to consult, see, e.g., Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52. 64-65 (1997). expressly disclaims as "beyond the scope of this Restatement" "[tlhe
complex set of rules and standards for resolving questions of federal preemption." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS:PRODS. LIAB. 5 4 cmt. e (2000). It would be particularly hard to find in the
section a judgment that state common law judges should have a general power of reaching common law results disruptive to a federal legislative scheme, in circumstances in which that power
had been explicitly denied state legislatures and executive bodies.
133. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 815 (1986).
134. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 892 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Suppose, my colleague Michael Dorf asks, a state legislature had adopted the Third
Restatement formulation of "design defect" as statutory standard to govern civil liability, and the
same question arose in that context. Now it appears that Section 1397 would not in terms apply
(no "common laww)-nor might Section 1392 (no "safety standard," in the probable intendment
of those words). Nonetheless the preemption question framed by the majority would again be
present.
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is a rather common precaution against seeming to interfere with "vested
rights," and implies nothing about state courts' law-making authority; it
simply denies a purpose to interfere with such claims as may already
exist under present state law. Many lawsuits would be preserved by
even the weakest of these readings. Liability for "design defects" was
not very well developed when the savings clause was enacted, but liability for manufacturing defects was. Section 1397 would defeat any
argument that, for example, a manufacturer could successfully defend
against liability for an accident that occurred when a particular turn
signal it had manufactured proved defective, by showing that the manufacturing run of its turn signals met the federal standards created for its
reliability. The latter showing would be sufficient to establish its
"[c]ompliance with any ~ e d e r amotor
l
vehicle safety standard" from the
federal regulatory per~pective.'~~
One easily understands the judgment
that that showing should not defeat liability for a manufacturing defect
in a particular instance.
Preserving exactly such actions is most likely what any member of
Congress who thought about the matter imagined the savings clause
would accomplish. It was enacted in 1966, the very same year as Section 1397. As George Priest has interestingly shown, the previous generation's development of strict liability principles, culminating in the
AL17s adoption of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts in
1966, was driven by concern with manufacturing defects, not design
defects.'37 A member of Congress thinking about the common law liability problem through that lens would not see frequent occasions for
actual disabling conflict between common law principles of liability and
the federal standards to be developed. She would not see a conflict between Section 1397 and her strong purpose to see that "motor vehicle
safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced, but that
they be uniform throughout the country."'38 She would simply wish to
be sure that in authorizing the creation of standards, Congress did not
interfere with the established remedies for manufacturing defects.
If one thinks, alternatively, that the savings clause should be read to
leave some room for the development of state common law principles,
there would remain the issue whether it was intended to pretermit questions of consistency with particular federal standards. The "design defect" issue raises these questions rather dramatically. Section 402A
came to be seen as having spoken to such defects; permitting them to be
found evidently can lead to judgments in conflict with safety standards
generated by federal regulation. However, it is hard to imagine that a
136. 15 U.S.C. 5 1397(k) (1988).
137. Priest, supra note 23,at 2303.
138. S. REP.NO. 1301, at 12 (1966).reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709,2720.
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Congress that explicitly denied to state legislatures and executives any
right to create policy in conflict with federal standards believed that it
was important that state common law judges be able to do so, unsupervised.
Thus, the minority's reading of the savings clause seems the least
probable, as well as the most problematic. If we are to imagine Section
1397 as extending to new developments in common law, not just those
existing when Congress acted, some possibility for judgment about the
consistency of those state common law developments with federal policy, as applied in particular circumstances, seems essential. Inevitably,
this would entail judgments of federal law and, just as inevitably,
judgments that would often have to be reached in particular cases by
federal courts. In its strong preference for federal executive or legislative action over federal judges running amok, but for unsupervised state
court judges making law in matters denied to their corresponding legislatures and executives because it might disturb important elements of
the federal program, the minority threatens to discard a central element
of federal court authority and presents us with a disturbingly bifurcated
view of the judicial role.
The importance of this issue is suggested by a datum marking the
majority opinion's initial paragraphs. A number of courts, state and
federal, had previously considered the relationship between Sections
1392(d) and 1397(k). All the state courts had found against preemption
in those cases; all the federal courts had found that state law had been
preempted.13' Justice Holmes once remarked, in relation to the Court's
policing of interstate commerce issues, that "I do not think the United
States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several state^."'^ The point
is no less apt for preemption issues. As in Schlemmer, the importance
of the Court's policing state common law for potential interference with
federal programs, within the area of federal legislative competence,
carries equal importance for the success of national government.
Federal questions are likely to involve statutes or regulations simply
because today we live in an age of statutes and regulations. Yet inevitably those statues and regulations will leave matters undecided,14' and in
this respect analyses that look only at the statutory function, are misleading. Putting the issue in these terms brings the particular issues in
Geier comfortably within the special case for "preemptive lawmaking"
139. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000).
140. HOLMES.supra note 1. at 295-96.
141. See, e.g., Harry W . Jones, Some Causes of Uncertainty in Statutes, 36 A.B.A. J . 321
(1950).
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that Thomas Merrill has persuasively identified.142It is a case about
federalism, but one in which successful federalism requires a national
common law court to assert its control over state common law tribunals
that may prove insufficiently attentive to national policy. A broader
case for federal common law in the strong sense, in the interstices of
Congress's action, would require an effort considerably more elaborate
than the preceding paragraphs, and it is clear enough that the dominant
judicial sentiment is ~nreceptive.'~~
Yet even as to the exercise of its
legislative power, we acknowledge Congress's authority to create sub~~
sidiary lawmaking functions in others, including the ~ 0 u r t s . IGranted
that, in the twenty-first century, the Court should focus its energies on
the statutes that now dominate the legal landscape (as they assuredly did
not in 1789), and conceding as well that legislative processes are often
superior to judicial ones in acquiring the information on which sound
policy can be made, we cannot blink the inevitable lawmaking implicit
in judicial decision of unanticipated matters. To do so is either to put
intolerable strain on what is denominated statutory construction or, as
Justice Jackson argued, to render the federal system "imp~tent.'"~~
Toward the beginning of the last century, progressive commentators
urged the use of statutes as preferable sources of instruction for the
courts in building towards coherent and just law, a process they identified with the common law.146Such uses are not interpretation as suchyet they are no more law-making, in the precedential sense or in their
operation on individuals, than interpretation. So long as one maintains
the common law habits of stare decisis, taking the view that "federal
tribunals" are limited to statutes and to what they say hardly abandons
the practice, nonetheless, of making law.I4' To turn to statutes one-by142. See Merrill. supra note 88.
143. See, for example, the oft-quoted dicta in Texas Industries. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc.:
The[ ] instances [in which federal courts are able to formulate common law] are
"few and restricted," and fall into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." and those
in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citations omitted). Compare with this the unselfconscious manner in
which the Court, in the shadow of Erie, refers to a "judge-made rule of equity." uncontroversially expressed as a federal rule, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93 (1943).
144. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI.L. REV. 533, 544-52
(1983) (invoking the example of the Sherman Act).
145. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV.L. REV. 383 (1908);
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV.L. REV. 4 (1936).
147. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996). In Neal, the Court invokes
stare decisis to require rigid adherence to its reading of a statute, once given, that could readily
have been read in another way. In civilian jurisdictions, the text with all of its possibilities-not
the Court's limiting judgment about its meaning-would continue as the controlling element.
Neal, 516 U.S. at 295.
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one, without a sense of responsibility for constructing (as best may be)
a unified whole, is nonetheless to give up the quest for coherence;I4'
this molecular capacity to legislate, that has been so important to the
appropriate functioning of the law, is simply wiped away. It abandons
the sense of partnership and of supportive collaboration in a mutual
enterprise, for a stance that, at heart, subordinates Congress and insists
on ultimate judicial authority as strongly as did Justice Brewer.
Indeed, one can often find in the interstices of the Court's opinions
continuing recognition of their necessary common law role even as it
sensibly also characterizes that role as subordinate to the Congress.
When operating in the shadows of federal statutes the Court unselfconsciously often writes simply as a common-law court. A unanimous
opinion decided in the same Term as Geier implicitly affirms the point,
while also suggesting a principled basis for prudential caution. Pegram
v. Herdrich, 14' concerning a health management organization's possible
liability for the harm a patient suffered as the result of a medical judgment its policies were alleged to have induced, led the Court into an
extended discussion of fiduciary responsibilities under common law
trust prin~ip1es.l~~
With ERISA lurking in the background, this would
plainly have been a federal question, and the discussion proceeds unselfconsciously in just the manner of late nineteenth century Supreme
Court discussions of issues of general commercial law. At an early
point in the argument, the Court considered whether to adopt a distinction proposed by the plaintiff-respondent that, if successful, would considerably have narrowed the sweep of a decision in her favor (and thus,
arguably, made it more palatable for judicial adoption). Said the Court:
[Alny legal principle purporting to draw a line between good
and bad HMOs would embody, in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk. A valid conclusion of this sort
would, however, necessarily turn on facts to which courts
would probably not have ready access: correlations between
malpractice rates and various HMO models, similar correlations
involving fee-for-service models, and so on. And, of course,
assuming such material could be obtained by courts in litigation
like this, any standard defining the unacceptably risky HMO
structure (and consequent vulnerability to claims like Herdrich's) would depend on a judgment about the appropriate level
of expenditure for health care in light of the associated malpractice risk. But such complicated fact-finding and such a debatable
148. Compare Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). in which the two Geier authors,
Justices Breyer and Stevens, join in a dissent criticizing their colleagues for just such a failure of
sensitivity.
149. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
150. Pegram. 530 U.S. at 222-26.
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social judgment are not wisely required of courts unless for
some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with
its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and
judgments of social value, such as optimum treatment levels and
health care expenditure. Cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-666 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
("Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass
and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as
complex and dynamic as that presented here" (quoting Walters
v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 33 1,
n.12 (1985))); Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,
513 (1982) ("[Tlhe relevant policy considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of
them. The very difficulty of these policy considerations, and
Congress' superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable" (footnote omitted)). '"
The reasoning here is not that federal courts cannot adopt suggested
legal principles in common law fashion, but that it may be unwise for
them to do so when those principles turn on assessments better suited
for legislative than adjudicative fact-finding. The parallel to the conventional arguments for preferring rulemaking to adjudication in administrative policymaking-while not excluding the latter as an available option to be used by the adjudicator as it finds it required-are evident.
The author of the Geier dissent, Justice Stevens, has in other contexts upbraided his colleagues for their failures to respect the incremental and reasoned processes of the common law.lS2 As judges are
lawmakers, the habits of the common law are what restrain them from
running amok. That risk is equally present among state judges as federal, particularly as regards federal matters, and federal judicial control
seems important to guard against its fruition.
Where all this is going, I would not venture to predict. Discussions
of federalism, statutory interpretation, or one's attitude toward congressional fact-finding generally find the Court split along predictable lines.
But not these issues. Every Justice, save perhaps Justice Breyer, has
subscribed to an opinion raising questions in one or another context
about the common law functions of federal courts. The discomfort is
widespread, and it is perhaps more instinctual than intellectual, a realization that the ground has shifted without yet quite knowing what to do
151. Id. at 221-22.
152. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164. 222 (1989); Cent. Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,201 (1994).
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about it. In the repeated arguments about precedent, the perhaps unexpected adherence to precedent in cases like Dickerson, one can find
expression of the tensions between the prior model of judging, and the
new powers of policy-directed choice. We cannot deny that what it
means to be a court has changed, although the change has nothing to do
with original understandings; it is the product of the last century's
changes in how law is made and, in particular, in the nature of judicial
review. The certiorari function brings forward the law-making side of
judging, and at the same time reflects a weakening of the possibilities
for hierarchical control within the judiciary. Our common-law premises
cannot explain either development. In groping for an understanding and
accommodation, the Justices appear often enough to be behaving in the
familiar, unconscious mode. In the unspoken battle between agendasetting and judging, we should all hope judging wins.

